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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE REINVENTION OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
LAWRENCE

E.

MITCHELL*

T

HE legal study of corporate governance is parochial. Since at least
Berle and Means, we have been concerned, almost exclusively, with
two (and sometimes three) of the corporation's statutory constituent
groups-directors and stockholders-with an occasional look at officers
(typically incidental to the role of the board).' At the same time, we have
focused our inquiry on the traditional internal laws of governance created
by the various states with, of course, Delaware, the brothel of corporate
law, as our principal focus.2
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act), 3 signed into law by President Bush
in July 2002, creates the need to re-think the way we approach our study of
corporate governance in two ways and has the potential (depending upon
the results of, and actions taken in response to, various studies that are
required to be completed under that Act during the next year) dramatically to change the way we think about, write about and teach corporate
law. The Act makes three specific changes in the way we think about corporate governance: first, it brings into the realm of internal governance
the gatekeepers that once stood outside the box, including auditors, analysts and lawyers. 4 Second, it significantly enhances the legal status of, and
centrality of corporate governance to, the chief executive officer and the
audit committee, two constituents that have received very little recognition
in the law and its literature. 5 Third, both in doing this and in other respects (like the prohibition of loans to officers and certain other conflict
of interest transactions), it federalizes an important dimension of the in* John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, The George Washington
University. My thanks go to Bill Bratton, Theresa Gabaldon, and Dalia Tsuk, and
for research help to Olivia Vasilescu and Christi Denecke.
1. Corporate governance has always been interested, to some extent, in issues
of compensation and managerial self-dealing, issues which only have increased in
importance since the fall of Enron. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L.
REv. 751, 784-86 (2002).

2. The laxity of Delaware law, or its significance, has long been a subject of
dispute. With such shameful and disingenuous opinions as In re Caremark Int4 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) and Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997), I
believe the matter can no longer be in dispute.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The

Act itself is largely codified in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
4. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 201, 307, 501 (regulating conduct of auditors,

lawyers and analysts).
5. See id. §§ 202, 301-02 (holding audit committees and chief executive officers responsible for corporation's various financial statements to public).

(1189)
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ternal laws of corporate governance, creating a new (albeit arguably narrow) duty of care for the CEO and audit committee and reintroducing
serious prohibitions on conflict of interest transactions that have eroded
to nothingness in the hands of the Delaware judiciary and legislature.6
In addition to these potential effects of the Act, it does something
that could, in the long run, have much greater significance for the health
of American business and our economy. As I have discussed elsewhere,
the principal causes of the corporate scandals of 2002 and the accompanying collapse in the stock market can be traced to the development over
several decades of an investing and managing ethic that favors short-term
increases in stock prices over the long-run profitability and well-being of
corporations. 7 While the seemingly endless discussion in the government,
the press and academia have not seemed to focus on short-termism, 8 nor
is there any evidence yet that investment and managerial norms have

changed in this respect as a result of the crisis, it remains the most complete and cogent explanation of an era in which managing earnings, often
to the brink of fraud and sometimes crossing that line, and the domination of finance over management, became the characteristics of our business life.
The Act has the potential to reverse this trend. Through its various
requirements, largely implemented already by SEC regulations (with a few
others proposed and in the comment stage), the Act has the potential to
make any attempts to manage earnings entirely transparent to the investment communityY In particular, some of the Act's requirements that may
affect management of earnings are: (1) the certification of senior executives that financial statements "fairly present" the financial condition of
their corporations and the SEC's regulatory addition to the Act of an emphasis on cash flows; (2) the regulatory requirements that issuers explain
financial information provided in non-GAAP format (that means, of
course, pro forma financial statements projecting earnings); 10 and (3) the
required discussion and tabular presentation of off-balance sheet financing and contingent liabilities related thereto in the MD&A portion of issuers' SEC filings. The effect of exposing those attempts (which may have
6. See id. § 206 (addressing conflicts of interest transactions).
7. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILIT. AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 4-7 (2001).
8. But see THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE (2003) (recognizing short-termism as a significant problem.)
9. Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance
Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33,8182, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,821
(Jan. 28, 2003).
10. See Coke to End Forecasting of Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at C2
(reporting that some companies-notably Warren Buffett corporations Coke, Gillette and The Washington Post-have already announced that they will no longer
issue quarterly or annual earnings projections). This represents at least one important acknowledgement, from our premier value-investor, that short-termism is
at the root of the problem. Cf id.
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been evident to professional analysts who, as we have seen and the Act
recognizes, were themselves part of the problem) makes clear to the entire
investing public the true financial picture of the corporation, regardless of
managements' attempts to conceal less-than-stellar earnings behind a veil
of complex financial and accounting mechanisms. 1' As a result, the Act
may well succeed in making the practice of managing earnings a fruitless
exercise. No longer will anybody-from individual investor to institutional investor to sophisticated analyst-be able to claim they were
fooled.

12

In addition, if the Act succeeds in making disclosure, especially financial disclosure, sufficiently transparent for the average investor easily to
understand, it may also have the salubrious effect of encouraging individuals to become investors rather than traders. To this end, the Act may induce them actually to read a corporation's 10K prior to making (and
holding) an investment, instead of treating market prices as the expression of actual value-prices driven not only by shady disclosure practices
and analysts' hype, but also by short-term trading and managing
mentalities.
If the Act achieves these goals, it has the potential to reverse a trend
that has been pronounced in American business over the last thirty years
or so-the dominance of finance over management.' While there are
many reasons to complain about the lackluster performance of American
corporations in the era of managerialism of the 1950s and 1960s, with its
accompanying excesses of economically irrational and managerially unwieldy conglomeration, the basic goal of managing business was not in
doubt. 14 Since that time, the rise and dominance of finance has forced
corporate business management to take a back seat to corporate finance,
with the result that the business of business is managing finance, driven by
the stock market, reversing the presumably more rational (and economically sound) strategy of allowing the stock market to reflect business-its
15
sales, its profits, its cash flows, its investments and its future prospects.
To the extent that exposure under the Act limits, if not destroys, the utility
11. The SEC's emphasis in the adopted and proposed regulations on cash
flows is particular evidence of this.
12. Except, of course, in cases of fraud and deliberate noncompliance, which
always remain distinct possibilities.
13. See OFFcE OF EDUC. RES. & IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGESTI OF
EDUc. 304-15 (2002); DIV. OF EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE

70 (1962).

14. One of the best descriptions of the excesses of this era remains the depiction of the ITT managers' meeting in RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION

76-77 (1976).

15. This is not to suggest that managers did not care about stock price in the
age of managerialism. Rather, it is to suggest that stock price was seen as a consequence of management, not the goal of management. Notably, over the past decade, stock subject to managerial stock options has come to represent
approximately fifteen percent of market capitalization, an undoubtedly strong inducement to managers to focus on their corporation's stock prices. See MITCHELL,
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of the tools of financial manipulation, corporate managers will find them-

selves once again required to attend to business. To the extent that rising
stock prices are desired, they will have to come from increased profitabil6
ity, not financial manipulation.'
In Part I, I set the background of the traditional roles of the gatekeepers now to be brought within the gates. 17 Part II explains how the Act and
the regulations link up these gatekeepers with aspects of corporate governance traditionally treated as internal to the corporation and their potential
effects on corporate governance. The message is that it is finally time for
scholars of corporate governance to look inside the corporate box, not
just at the structure, in order to understand and evaluate the important
linkages between outside parties, corporate structure and actual corporate
behavior."' Part III concludes with a more detailed examination of the
ways in which the Act has the potential to defeat the hegemony of finance
over business and, in the process, reverse the ethic of stock price shorttermism to long-run business management, as well as the ways in which
this not only will benefit corporations and their shareholders but their
9
constellation of constituents as well.'
These insights are necessarily speculative. The Act is new. Regulations are in the process of being adopted. We have hardly begun to sort
through the various causes of the corporate crisis of 2002. Moreover, corporate managers, investment bankers, accountants and lawyers have
shown themselves to be enormously adept at evading the substance of regulation even as they may comply with its form. In the absence of detailed
regulation and vigorous enforcement, the Act could turn out to be so
much sound and fury signifying nothing. I therefore present these observations in the spirit of suggesting what the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be at its
best. 20 Whether in practice it achieves these results remains to be seen.
supra note 7, at 223 (noting that stock option incentive plans have made many
executives rich).
16. This is also one of the clear implications of President Bush's recently enacted proposal to eliminate the tax on corporate dividends. It is far more difficult
to manufacture cash than it is to manufacture stock price. While I have reservations about the proposal, it is consistent with the idea in the Act that businesses
should be run for business (and thus increasing profits), not speculators.
17. For a further discussion on the traditional functions of auditors, lawyers
and analysts compared to their current responsibilities and functions, see infra
notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion on the new role of corporate governance, see
infra notes 41-94 and accompanying text. I earlier suggested the importance of
this endeavor in Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist
Society, 24J. CORP. L. 869, 877 (1999).
19. For a further discussion of how the Act may force firms to focus on long-

term business management and the associated beneficial impact of such, see infra
notes 95-121 and accompanying text.
20. In this respect I suppose I adopt something of the posture of Ronald
Dworkin's Hercules, albeit in a regulatory context, telling the best story of the law
that can be told in light of our collective interests and traditions. See RONALD
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THE FoXES IN THE HENHOUSE

The traditional function of the gatekeepers of our corporate systemauditors, lawyers and analysts-was to stand outside the corporate structure and evaluate, from the perspective of their respective expertise, the
financial condition, legal conduct and business prospects of the corporation. Each of these gatekeepers had, and continues to have, a different
relationship with the corporation than the others. Auditors, for example,
have been charged with an independent role in verifying the corporation's
financial reporting compliance with generally accepted accounting principles. 2 1 Lawyers, consistent with their professional obligations, are more
closely identified with the corporation, its secrets and interests, appearing
in the public interest only indirectly to help keep the corporation's behavior within the boundaries of the law and, rarely, directly in the case of
major corporate criminal behavior. 22 Both of these gatekeepers are compensated by the corporation for their services, although in the case of the
auditor that fact has always created some conflict in the auditor's independence and leaves it subject to pressure by the audited corporation. 23 Analysts have no direct relationship to the corporation, serving instead as their
clients the brokerage houses for which they work and, indirectly, the commission-paying clients of those houses who rely upon the analysts' independent financial and business evaluations of the corporation's health
24
and prospects in making investment decisions.
Each of these gatekeepers has, of course, its own body of regulation
with which it must comply. That of the accounting industry is, perhaps,
most Byzantine. The accounting profession has been, until the Act, an
entirely self-regulating one-except to the extent that the SEC has disciplinary jurisdiction over accountants practicing before it and the statutory
authority to set substantive accounting rules (as to which it typically defers
to the accounting profession). Auditing standards have been generally
promulgated by the Accounting Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); auditing rules and princiLAw's EMPIRE 397-99 (1986). Those approaching these issues with a
more cynical perspective could, quite reasonably, have different insights.
21. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 204(k) (2), 116 Stat.
745, 733 (2002) (requiring auditors to report any alternative treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting principles).
DwoRKIN,

22. See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary'sFiduciary:Legal Ethics in FiduciaryRepre-

sentation, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 889, 917 (1994) (stating that attorney has "utmost loyalty
toward the corporation").
23. I admit to having been puzzled by the hue and cry over accounting firms'
consulting businesses during the crisis. While this development may have raised

the numbers, it is clearly the case that accountants have always suffered from a
conflict of interest between their own pocketbooks and the public interest for at
least as long as we have permitted them to be paid by the corporations they were

charged with publicly auditing.
24. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians as the Gatekeepers?: A Proposalfor a Modified
Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 525 (2001) (discussing role of analysts
and their conflicts of interest).
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pies by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 25 As a result,
and despite the inchoate regulatory authority of the Commission, accounting rules and standards are promulgated by accountants, and therefore
subject to the influence and pressure of paying clients. 2 6 Policing of ac-

counting standards is left to the accounting firms which, on a rotating
basis, sample and test each others' work.
The cartelization of the accounting industry has exacerbated the potential weakness of this system. From the Big Eight firms a decade ago
(itself a small number) we are, with the demise of Arthur Andersen following its federal conviction for obstruction ofjustice in the Enron case, down
to the Big Four. The effect of this is, obviously, to leave these gatekeepers
themselves unguarded, a dangerous proposition in light of the financial
incentives to serve the wills of the audited corporations rather than to
maintain their independence.
Lawyers are in a somewhat different position. As I noted earlier, their
job is not to protect the public interest, at least not directly, but to protect
the interest of the corporation. While lawyers, like industry, can lobby
Congress and state legislatures, the rules they apply are the output of the
legislative process and, even recognizing the insights of public choice theory, less manipulable by lawyers for their clients' interests than are the
accounting rules and standards. To the extent the creation of these laws is
manipulable, they are theoretically more likely to be manipulated by lawyers in the interests of their corporate clients than against them.
But here is the rust in the hinges of the gate kept by lawyers. While
we know, and while ethics rules recognize, that the corporate lawyer's client is the corporation, and it is the interests of the corporate body the
lawyer is obligated to represent, we also know (and especially those of us
that have practiced corporate law know) that the interest of the corporation is expressed by a body of humans: the board of directors. But even
that expression of corporate interest is more exceptional than typical, occurring only in the cases of major corporate decisions and transactions
which are, by definition, infrequent, but which are the grist for the corporate lawyer's daily practice.
As a practical matter, the lawyers handling a corporation's problems,
whether in-house or outside counsel, are likely to take their orders (and
thus the expression of corporate interest) from a variety of human beings,
ranging from the chief executive officer to, in the case of lower level in25. See Jack Friedman, Chapter 11 FinancialReporting Rules for Debtors: The Impact on Creditors, Shareholders, New Investors, and the Bar, 9 BANKR. DEv. J. 257, 258

(1992) (discussing how AICPA promulgated new rules for financial reporting by
companies); see also RALPH ESTES, DICTIONARY OF AccoUNTING 60 (2d ed. 1985)
(showing how regulations come partly from widely followed accounting literature

and practices).
26. This has been true ever since we determined that auditors would be paid
by their clients, despite the recent public focus on accounting firms providing consulting services and the additional conflicts that practice creates.
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house counsel, middle-level managers. While each in their respective capacities, and subject to the levels of authority granted to them, these actors
speak for the corporation, they all also have their own self-interests to pursue, self-interests regulated in part by the traditional state rules of corporate law. The problem, of course, is that while the lawyer is conscious of
his role as representing the corporation's interest, it is also the case (as any
practicing lawyer knows) that it becomes easy to identify with an individual
or individuals representing that client. Thus, it is easy for those individuals to rationalize the reconciliation of corporate interest and their own
interest, and it is often difficult, except in the most blatant of cases, for the
lawyer to determine where one ends and the other begins-and even
more so to challenge the individual when the lawyer believes that the orders he is given serve the individual's interest at the expense of the
27
corporation.
Lawyers also self-regulate through state supreme courts and bar associations, subject to the individual states' rules of professional responsibility. (The Commission also has disciplinary power over lawyers practicing
before it who violate its rules.) 28 Those rules, mired in a tradition of fiduciary loyalty to clients' interests, are far less subject to manipulative pressure than accountants' rules because they are, for the most part and unlike
the accountants' rules, designed to align the lawyers' behavior with the
clients' interests. 29 But this, too, presents a problem. To the extent that
lawyers come to identify with the individuals with whom they daily deal,
instead of the intangible corporation they are bound to represent, they
too are subjected to tangible and psychological pressures to conform their
advice and behavior to the interests of those individuals.3 0 Thus another
aspect of our gatekeeper system, while not quite the Maginot Line
presented by the regulatory structure of the accounting profession is, at a
minimum, seriously weakened.
27. The SEC has, in attorney conduct rules under the Act, taken the opportunity to lecture corporate lawyers on this issue. See Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33,8185, [2002-2003
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,823 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Close Corporation:Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. Rxv. 466, 476-81 (1989) (illustrating exaggerated way in
which this problem is manifested in close corporations).
28. See SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2003); In re Carter, 47
S.E.C. 471, 472 (1981); In re Keating, 47 S.E.C. 95, 95 (1979).
29. See Tuttle, supra note 22, at 895-900 (arguing that lawyers who serve clients
in fiduciary roles serve their clients' interests by understanding those interests in
light of fiduciary functions lawyers serve).
30. For example, attorneys at Vinson & Elkins were significantly involved in
crafting Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) for Enron. Under this structure, "independent" investors, who were sometimes high-ranking Enron executives, would maintain equity investment in the SPE to at least three percent of the SPE's total assets
so that Enron could claim it did not exercise control over the SPE. Therefore,
Enron would not have to record the debt as its own or write-down the assets if they
became impaired. SeeJeremy Kahn, OffBalance Sheet-And Out of Control, FORTUNE,
Feb. 4, 2002.
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The third major barrier is the community of securities analysts. 3 ' Unlike accountants and lawyers, analysts are neither retained by nor paid by
the corporation. 3 2 In fact, they choose or are assigned the corporations
on which they focus. But they serve an important gate-keeping function
for all that.
Analysts are hired by brokerage firms to analyze the financial past,
present and future of each of the corporations they follow, compare their
assessments with the market price of their respective stock, evaluate the
quality of that corporation as an investment, and provide that information
to their firms' brokers who, in consideration of the commissions charged
to investors in trades, will recommend investments based on the analysts'
conclusions. 33 While analysts are financially trained in a manner that is
usually superior to that of the average client, their work is nothing that the
client could not do himself or herself if he or she had the time. The analysts' principal value lies in saving the investor that time, thus allowing the
investor more broadly to diversify the investor's portfolio. Analysts also, as
a practical matter and because of their access to company officials, can
obtain soft information that otherwise would not be available to the average investor. In that respect, the analyst is capable of giving a more
nuanced assessment of the investment merits of a particular corporation
than even well-trained average investors willing to put in the time.
But the analysts' importance goes well beyond providing advice to
their firms' clients. As the central players in the financial analysis of corporate America in an age of diversification, they are the actors best situated to evaluate the veracity of a corporation's public information as well
as the actors who, by position and training, ought to be the first line of
skepticism. As recent events have shown, in those respects they have dismally failed.
Analysts are not a self-regulating profession.3 4 They, or at least the
brokers they serve, are subject to the broker-dealer rules promulgated by
the Commission, and to the rules of the various stock exchanges. They are
also regulated by the National Association of Securities Dealers, whose
rules are designed to prevent bad practices like churning accounts, at the
same time as they work to encourage analysts (and the brokers who use
their information) to, at a relatively low level of intensity, work in the cli31. One could talk sensibly here about the rating agencies as well, but since
corporate governance has not traditionally focused on creditors, nor is it likely to
any time soon, to do so would be off point.
32. See Employment Dev. Dept., Labor Mkt. Info.: Cal. Occupational Guide
Number 260: Investment Analysis (1995), at http://www.calmis.cahwnet.gov/file/
occguide/INVEST.htm (noting that investment analysts' services are used by investment brokers, banks, pension funds, insurance companies and investment
banking firms).
33. See id.
34. See Joel S. Demski, Corporate Conflicts of Interest 19-23, at http://
bear.cba.ufl.edu/demski/PDFJUNK/conflict3.pdf.
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ents' interests. 35 Nonetheless, analysts are subject to pressures and perverse incentives of their own. In the first place, to the extent that they are
rewarded with valuable, nonpublic information (soft information, that is,
not the material information that would be the subject of insider trading),
they have incentives to keep their corporate contacts happy which, presumably, means recommending stock.3 6 Moreover, to the extent that
their compensation is dependent upon the success of the brokerage firm
for which they work, analysts have an incentive to ensure that brokers are
able to generate commissions, and thus to ensure a steady flow of information thatjustifies stock trading.3 7 Third, as has become a central act in the
corporate follies of 2002, to the extent that they work for firms that also do
investment banking, they have incentives to say nice things about corporations that might become investment banking clients of their firms and
thus enrich them. 38 In the face of these pressures, the relatively weak
rules that regulate analysts clash with their financial incentives and further
weaken the gates our legal and financial systems have erected to keep cor39
porations honest.
Students of corporate governance have not traditionally treated any
of these three groups as relevant to their subject of study, the relationship
among boards, officers and stockholders. To the extent they intersect
with corporate governance issues in the context of securities regulation,
which itself has largely been treated as peripheral to corporate governance, lawyers and accountants in particular have received some attention,
but not much. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act changes that. By directly connecting the functions of these gatekeepers to the traditional corporate governance machinery (and by creating the potential for even further
connections), it compels us to recognize these actors as centrally involved
in the processes of corporate governance. And by creating (or authorizing
the creation of) substantive rules to govern their outputs and behavior, it
serves not only to alter the ways in which we look at the corporation but
also to strengthen the relatively weak rules state law provides to regulate
corporate governance, much in the way that an earlier generation of re40
formist scholars hoped that the securities laws themselves would.
35. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, NASD MANUAL (2002),
available at http://www.nasdr.com.
36. Cf Demski, supra note 34, at 17-18.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Notably, the Act does not address the particular problems presented by
the credit rating agencies, presumably because the corporate scandals of 2002
principally involved stock. See Lynn Hume, RatingAgencies: Panel: SEC Should Draft
Standardsfor Raters, BOND BUYER, Oct. 8, 2002, at 5.
40. See generally Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Ernest L. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1969); Partnoy, supra note 24, at 514-15. As we all know,
these reformist efforts withered on the vine as the Supreme Court first narrowly
interpreted the securities laws in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) and, eventually with the aid of Congress, substantially deregulated them.
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BRINGING THE BARBARIANS INSIDE THE GATE

Accountants and the Federalizationof Corporate Governance

The Act connects auditors with the board and management in a way
that brings them inside the corporate box. Title II of the Act gives the
corporation's audit committee a substantial role in monitoring auditor independence and avoiding conflicts of interest. 4 1 But most interesting for
the link between accounting reform and the federalization of corporate
governance is the manner in which Title III, the Corporate Responsibility
portion of the Act, links accounting reform with the internal affairs of the
corporation. 42 A simple listing of those provisions would make this clear,
but I shall indulge in somewhat more detailed discussion.
The real action lies in the way the Act specifies the duties of a corporation's board of directors. In the first place, every listed corporation is
required either to have an audit committee composed solely of indepen43
dent directors or to treat the board as a whole as the audit committee.
Two things about the corporate governance aspect of this requirement are
notable. First, the Act specifies not only the composition of the audit committee but also the procedures by which the audit committee is to operate,
requiring each corporation to provide "appropriate funding" for its audit
committee and requiring that the audit committee establish procedures
for "the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the
issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters; and the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the
issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters."'44 While the Act does not specify the exact procedures the audit
committee is to adopt, the fact that it specifies the nature of the procedures, including the very substantive one of establishing whistle-blowing
chains, goes far toward setting a standard of care that seems already to be
substantially in excess of that required generally by state corporate law.
Moreover, the Act not only requires that the audit committee consist
of independent directors, but it also defines the meaning of independence, a definition heretofore left to state law, and in a more rigorous way

than does, for example, Delaware or New York. The Act defines "independent" as a director who may not "accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer; or be an affiliated person of the issuer
or any subsidiary thereof. '45 Both Delaware and New York, at least for
some purposes (derivative suit dismissal, for example) have less stringent
requirements for independence. 46 In this respect, the Act can be said to
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 §§ 202, 204, 206, 116
Stat. 745 (2002).
42. See id. § 303.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See
Id.
Id.
See

id. § 301.
§ 301 (m) (4) (A)-(B).
§ 301 (m) (3) (B)i-ii.
generally Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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have established a higher duty of loyalty for public corporations than currently exists under state law. At a minimum, it federalizes the definition of
independent director for general purposes.
The regulations go further than does the Act. 47 Section 407 of the
Act directs the Commission to adopt disclosure rules defining the term
"audit committee financial expert" and requiring an issuer to disclose
whether its audit committee includes a financial expert. 48 Not only does
the regulation require this disclosure, but it imposes on the board the
obligation to specifically identify that person or persons it has determined
to meet the definition and fill the role of "audit committee financial expert."49 In addition, the regulation goes beyond the Act in requiring dis5
closure of whether the audit committee financial expert is independent. 0
The Commission's regulations have the potential to have significant
impacts on corporate governance. In addition to the board and its committees, we will now have the ability to identify a new kind of director, an
"audit committee financial expert" who is far more likely than not to be
independent in light of the Commission's requirement that this fact be
disclosed. And while the Commission is explicit in noting that the financial expert is not, by that designation alone, subject to a "higher degree of
individual responsibility or obligation as a member of the audit committee," 5 1 nor does such a designation constitute the financial expert an "expert" for liability purposes under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
it undoubtedly is the case that the designation of a director as a financial
expert will, as a psychological matter, impose upon that director a greater
sense of responsibility for the corporation's financial affairs than would be
the case in the absence of such designation. 5 2 The financial expert will
undoubtedly spend far more time with the corporation's accountants as
well, further bringing them inside the gate.
Finally, the fact that an identifiable person is disclosed to be the corporation's financial expert will allow investors to demand specific accountability from a member of the board (even if the regulations do not impose
greater duties on that person.) This is likely to have the salubrious effect
of diminishing the fractured accountability (or the ability of a director to
hide in the group) that currently characterizes our corporate governance
structure. This exposure is likely to lead the financial expert to be vigilant
in a manner that is unusual for the average director, and will most likely
(because of the financial expert's public exposure) give her greater au47. See Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 33,8177, [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,818, at 86,886 (Jan. 23, 2003).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. 86,818, at 86,893.
52. For the moral psychological processes that lead to this result and the result described in the text following, see MITCHELL, supra note 7.
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thority on the board. To the extent that the corporation and its accountants engage in financial shenanigans, the financial expert is the person
left hanging out to dry. The effect of the Act and the proposed regulations is likely to be a substantially greater presence of accountants in the
boardroom.
In addition, the highly publicized certification of the financial statements required of the chief executive officer and chief financial officer
serves an important function. 53 This provision accomplishes three things
in terms of reforming internal corporate governance. In the first place, it
makes the audit central to the nature of care in corporate governance,
linking the public auditor to the two most important officers of the corporation. Going forward, CEOs and CFOs have no choice but to work directly with auditors in evaluating financial statements and thus defining
the determinants of corporate performance.
Second, it makes these non-statutory (as a state law matter) corporate
actors statutorily required (as a federal matter) for publicly held corporations. In so doing, it expands upon state requirements of corporate governance as a legal matter (even if such officers already have a central place
as a practical matter) and thus directs corporate governance scholars to
focus more sharply on the role of these corporate actors in a way that,
while familiar to management scholars, is less so to lawyers. It forces us to
look inside the box we have defined as the parameters of corporate governance and, having opened that box, will almost certainly lead us to explore, in far greater detail than is yet common in the literature, the
relationship among these officers, the board, and officers lower down the
executive chain. One might even go so far as to say (although it is premature to say so in a strong way) that it ought to diminish our obsession with
the board as the central focus of corporate governance and instead lead us
to spend more time examining where the real power (and now where
meaningful federal regulation) lies, the corporation's executives.
Third, Title III, by linking accounting reform with the internal affairs
of a corporation, imposes on officers a substantial duty of care with respect
to the corporation's financial statements which, on its face and w:thout
the benefit of judicial interpretation, seems to be significantly more stringent than that required of the board (and certainly of the officers) under
state corporate law. Not only does the Act require certification of the
financials, which already goes beyond state law, but it also makes these
officers "responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls; ...

design[ing] such internal controls to ensure that material infor-

mation relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is made
known to such officers; . . . [and] evaluat[ing] the effectiveness of the
issuer's internal controls .... ,,54 Moreover, it requires these officers to

53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(2002).
54. Id. § 302(a) (4) (A)-(C).
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disclose to the audit committee "all significant deficiencies" in the design
and operation of internal controls, as well as to report any material or
immaterial fraud that involves employees who have responsibilities for in55
ternal controls.
The regulations under the Act take matters still further. First, as I
noted above, is the virtual requirement of a designated financial expert on
the board whose responsibility for the integrity of the corporation's financial condition follows as a corollary from her public identification and
56
accountability.
But it does far more. In the first place, and as will become more relevant in Part III, the Commission requires that certification not be just of
compliance of the corporation's financial statements with GAAP, but include a requirement that these officers certify that the corporation's financial statements "and other financial information included in the report,
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer ....,,57 Thus, the CEO and CFO are
required to represent that any financial information presented (which
presumably includes pro forma financial statements not in accordance
with GAAP) give a fair picture of the corporation's financial status. Moreover, while the Act does not require this certification to cover cash flows,
the Commission has added this requirement as consistent with the need
for fair presentation. 58 The certification responsibilities of the CEO and

CFO impose upon them a greater centrality in the corporate governance
process (at least with regard to finance) than the law of corporate governance now contemplates.
This is further illustrated by additional certification requirements
(which meet up with disclosure requirements; that which is to be certified
must also be disclosed.) 59 Among the disclosures to be made are the issuer's "disclosure controls and procedures," a new concept introduced in
the regulations."0 Disclosure controls and procedures are designed to ensure that information the issuer is required to disclose in its filings with
the Commission is properly collected and processed so that disclosure occurs in a timely manner. 6' Moreover, the CEO and CFO are required to
certify that they not only are responsible for designing and maintaining
those controls, but that they also have evaluated their effectiveness and
disclosed their evaluations. 62 With respect to the issuer's internal con55. Id. § 302(a) (5) (A).
56. See id. § 407.
57. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Securities Act Release No. 33,8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,720, at 86,128 (Aug. 28, 2002).
58. See id.
59. See id. 86,720, at 86,133.
60. See id.
61. See id. (discussing rule requirements).
62. See id.
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trols, CFOs and CEOs must further certify that they have identified any
"significant" deficiencies to the corporation's auditors and audit committee, as well as any fraud, whether or not material, involving employees who
have a role in the issuer's internal controls. 63 Moreover, these reports are
to be included in the issuer's Commission filings. 64 It seems clear that, at
least as to the presentation of financial information and the corporation's
internal processes both for SEC reporting and for auditing, these two officers have been burdened with what is, in effect, a federal duty of care.
But there is more that goes to issues traditionally thought of within
the context of governance. Among the disclosures the corporation is required to make is whether it has adopted a code of ethics governing the
corporation's "principal executive officer, principal financial officer,
[and] principal accounting officer or controller" and an explanation, in
the absence of such a code, of such absence. 6 5 The Act defines "code of
ethics" to mean standards "reasonably necessary to promote honest and
ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships; [and]
full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in the periodic
reports required to be filed by the issuer ....-66 The Commission, in its
regulations, goes beyond the Act and requires such a code to focus on

senior financial officers and adds "principal executive officer." 67 Moreover, whereas the Act's definition of code of ethics is largely that presented
above, the rules add that such a code also must be a "codification of standards that is reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing" and promote

"avoidance of conflicts of interest" in the first place and "prompt internal
reporting" of violations of the code, as well as disclosure of "accountability

6
for adherence to the code."
While the Commission (rightly, at least in form) claims that its approach to codes of ethics is consistent with the general securities law policy
of disclosure, the claim is somewhat disingenuous in two respects. First is
the definition of codes of ethics noted above, which clearly specifies the
substance that such a code of ethics is required to address. Second (and
this is the formal truth) is the fact that the requirement that such a code of
ethics be disclosed and filed more or less assures that every reporting company will adopt such a code or something that is substantially similar. In
8

63. The Commission does not define the term "internal controls," which has

a pre-existing meaning and relates to auditing standards. See AMERICAN
OF CERTIFIED
STANDARDS §

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS CODIFICATION

INSTITUTE

OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING

319 (1998) (giving meaning of term in required certification).
64. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8177 [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,818, at 86,895 (Jan. 23, 2003).
65. Id.
66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 406(c) (1)-(2), 116 Stat.
745, 789-90 (2002).
67. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8177, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,818, at 86,895 (Jan.23, 2003).
68. Id.
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these respects, and given the fairly rigorous substantive requirements of
the code (standards "preventing" conflicts of interest), the Act and regulations rather clearly impart substantive governing principles into the corporation, and indeed, when added to the certification requirement, seem to
establish a rather rigorous federal duty of care.
Compare what the Act does in this respect to the incredibly weak system of corporate monitoring approved by the Delaware Chancery Court in
that most disingenuous of opinions, In re Caremark.69 In that case, Chancellor Allen gave a great deal of lip service to Delaware's standards of supervision and the extent to which they were met by Caremark's cosmetic
policies in a case in which it was obvious, to the even marginally sophisticated observer, that Caremark's compensation system and management
structure were set up in every way possible to create incentives for employees to disregard the Anti-Referral Payment Law and defraud the Medicare
program. 70 The Act actually creates serious incentives for executives to
ensure that an effective internal monitoring standard exists.

71

The teeth

behind the Act are that it makes the CEO and CFO subject not only to
securities law violations, but also to disgorgement of potentially substantial
portions of their compensation, if they fail to fulfill those standards. Thus
is a federal duty of care clearly introduced by the Act, tied in large measure to the motivating ideal of accounting reform.
The Act also provides its own duty of loyalty rules which are far more
stringent than the flabby rules that dominate state law. Section 402 severely restricts the circumstances under which corporations can make
loans to insiders such that only loans of a certain type and under standards
made in the ordinary course of business by that corporation (which, for
the most part, means credit card companies, banks and brokerage houses)
are permitted. 72 This is something that responsible state corporate governance should already have dealt with. After all, the only "fair" basis
upon which loans can truly be said to be made to insiders are those as to
which the interest rate is equal to the corporation's average rate of return
on its business projects. Of course this is often not the case. To the extent
that such loans are, as they clearly are, a form of compensation, the fact
that such compensation is made in the form of loans makes it more difficult for stockholders to value. State law disclosure requirements as to such
loans are, at best, insipid.
Again, we can look to one of the more disingenuous opinions of the
Delaware Chancery Court, Chancellor Allen's opinion in Lewis v. Vogelstein,73 for confirmation. There the issue was disclosure of an admittedly
69. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
70. See generally id. (holding directors of Caremark did not breach duty to
monitor and supervise enterprise).
71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404 (discussing "Management Assessment of Internal Controls").
72. See id. § 402 (discussing "Enhanced Conflict of Interest Provisions").
73. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997).
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difficult to value grant of stock options. The Chancellor, noting that the
options were not susceptible to valuation under the commonly used BlackScholes model, concluded that no disclosure was required.7 4 According
to the Chancellor, disclosure might, after all, mislead or confuse stockholders. 75 But unmentioned in the opinion is a simple fact that the Chancellor had to have known: the directors who were the recipients of those
options had some opinion as to their value. How could they not? After
all, nobody accepts an offer of compensation without some clear sense of
what it is worth. Nonetheless, the Chancellor did not require the directors' own estimates (clearly material information) to be disclosed to the
stockholders. Moreover, there is another indication that the directors had
to have had some sense of the value of the options. Surely to approve
compensation in amounts that were indeterminable would be uninformed
compensation and thus, without such knowledge (or at least opinion), the
directors would have been unable to satisfy even Delaware's minimal requirements of the business judgment rule. The Act dispenses with such
nonsense by, at least in the case of publicly held corporations, supplanting
substantive state law rules with federal rules of internal corporate
governance.
B.

Lawyers

The next category of gatekeeper brought by the Act within the corporate governance system is the lawyer, and the Act potentially radically
changes the lawyer's role. Not surprisingly, this has proven to be perhaps
the most controversial portion of the Act. The Commission implicitly acknowledges this in its proposed release, which is highly defensive and as
much constitutes a brief in support of Congress's and the Commission's
position as it is an explication of the rules. 76 Not surprisingly, the Commission backed off its initial position in the final rules.
The Act makes the lawyer, in a meaningful way, a coordinate constituent of the corporate governance process. The Commission follows this
conception of the lawyer as a coordinate part of the corporate governance
machinery rather explicitly: "Attorneys . . . play an important and ex-

panding role in the internal processes and governance of issuers .... "77
Section 307 of the Act requires the Commission to issue rules setting
forth the duties of lawyers in this regard, and the rules that it contemplates
will create a whistle blowing role for lawyers or, to put the matter perhaps
a bit more modestly, a monitoring role for lawyers that requires them to
74. See id. at 329 (holding no obligation for directors to disclose value of future options).
75. See id. at 330 n.5 (discussing possibility of misleading disclosures).
76. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33,8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,802 (Jan 29, 2003). To characterize at least portions of the release as
defensive in tone is likely a bit of an understatement.
77. See id. 86,824, at 87,113.
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police corporate misconduct. This provision does so by requiring lawyers
to report various kinds of malfeasance to the corporation's general counsel or CEO and, failing satisfactory action by the reportee, lawyers must
report this evidence to the audit committee of the board or an independent board. 78 The Commission has also proposed the addition of lawyers'
obligations to engage in "noisy withdrawals" in the event that an unsatisfactory response is forthcoming.7 9 Thus, the Act brings within the governance structure an actor almost wholly ignored in corporate governance
scholarship-the outside counsel.
But the way in which the Act does this is striking and has significant
implications for the federalization of corporate law. Not only are lawyers
required to "rat out" material violations of the securities laws by the corporation or its agents, they are also required to report "breaches of fiduciary
duty or similar violation [s]," violations which the Supreme Court has told
us in no uncertain terms are the exclusive province of state law and have
no business in federal securities legislation. 8" Well, now they do. The
Commission defines "breach of fiduciary duty" as "any breach of fiduciary
or similar duty recognized under an applicable federal or state statute or
at common law," including, but not limited to, misfeasance, nonfeasance,
abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions." 8 1 In creating this requirement, the Act not only makes the lawyer a
central actor in the monitoring function of corporate governance with
which we, as a profession, have been centrally concerned, but it also links
that role directly to state substantive law. The potential either is for better
corporate governance through an additional monitoring organ or, as I
fear in my more cynical moments, a further watering-down of state law
fiduciary duty to protect corporate lawyers, especially in their counseling
role.
The implications are more significant than even these very significant
effects might appear at first blush. For while lawyers have always counseled corporate clients with respect to fiduciary obligations, as instruments
of the corporation's interest informed by boards and officers, the lawyer is
frequently asked to counsel action and design transactions in ways that
may come close to fiduciary breaches (and, sometimes, arguably are fiduciary breaches.) 82 This is likely to be changed by the Act, or at least the
incentives for changed behavior and more finely conscientious counseling
78. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 307, 116 Stat. 745,
784 (2002) (discussing rules of professional responsibility).
79. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8186, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,824, at 87,114.
80. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 496 (1977).
81. Securities Act Release No. 33,8185, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
86,823, at 87,077.
82. It is of course the latitude of fiduciary law that creates the gray areas in
which such counseling can occur. I do not by this statement mean to suggest that
lawyers generally and knowingly counsel corporations or their boards or officers to
violate their clear fiduciary obligations.
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are clear. 8 1 For now the lawyer is obligated to report breaches of fiduciary
obligation, and is subject to Commission sanctions for failing to do so.
With their own liability and professional well-being on the line, it seems
reasonable to expect that lawyers will be less aggressive in fiduciary counseling than they might have been-that is, less aggressive in counseling
close to the line-and certainly more likely to see breaches of fiduciary
84
obligation where they might have been overlooked before.
At the same time that the Act and the Commission appear to have
taken an aggressive position toward attorneys' whistle-blowing obligations,
at least to the extent the Act includes breaches of fiduciary duty within its
contemplation, the Commission has attempted to temper the potentially
freezing effect the rules will have on client counseling. 85 In its release
announcing the proposed rule on the matter, the Commission disavowed
any attempt to destroy the "consultative process" between lawyer and client.8 6 It stated that the reporting duty does not apply where the law is
"unsettled" as to a particular course of action, which seems vaguely problematic if the Act is to be meaningful in this respect, since the outcome of
fiduciary cases is highly fact dependent, and it is arguable that many fiduciary breaches occur under circumstances where the application of the law
to the facts is "unsettled."8 7 This language does not appear in the release
adopting the final rule, creating some ambiguity as to its strength. The
final rule adopts an objective standard, relying largely on the lawyer's judgment, as to when a violation must be reported "that it is reasonably likely
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.")
But the Commission backs off even further. It notes in the release announcing the proposed rule that even where the proposed course of action has been held illegal in other jurisdictions, no reporting duty arises
unless it has been held illegal in the issuer's jurisdiction.88 Even if the
officer informs the lawyer that the officer intends to pursue a course of
action held illegal in the issuer's jurisdiction, no reporting obligation
83. See Tuttle, supra note 22, at 937.
84. See id.

85. It would not be a huge surprise to see a substantial increase in legal fees
by corporate firms to cover their increased risk of discipline by the Commission for
violation of the new rules. In addition, while one would not expect to see it from
this particular Supreme Court, one could imagine a future court implying a private
right of action against attorneys under Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See

Lawrence E. Mitchell, No Business Like No Business, in THE

REHNQUIST COURT

227-

28 (Herman Schwartz ed., 2002).
86. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,823, at 86,532 (Nov. 21, 2002).
87. Id.
88. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8150, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,802, at 86,532 (Nov. 21, 2002).If we are dealing with
fiduciary matters of a public corporation, the issuer's jurisdiction is more likely
than not to be Delaware, in which precious little conduct is held illegal as a fiduciary matter.
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arises until the officer actually engages in the action. 89 After all, as the
Commission notes, the officer could always change its mind.1° Thus, it
appears, at least as to fiduciary reporting, that the Commission tried its
best to back off the Act's clear requirement and diminish the role of the
lawyer as an instrument of corporate governance, especially where fiduciary obligation is concerned. As one who is somewhat agnostic on the requirements of section 307, 1 do not find this particularly bothersome.
However, the language is absent from the release adopting the final rule,
creating some uncertainty as to how one interprets "material violation.". 9 1
C.

Analysts

Finally we come to a group that has traditionally been completely beyond the Pale of corporate governance-securities analysts. Just as the
credit rating agencies (as to which the Act demands an efficacy study)
have served bondholders by providing supposedly objective advice on the
investment quality of corporate bonds, the even less visible securities analysts fed their research to brokers and clients in what one might have
hoped was an effort to provide an objective assessment of the financial
condition and business prospects of the companies they followed. While
we now know (if we had not already suspected) that their collective performance in this endeavor was deeply flawed, we have, as a profession,
relied heavily upon analysts as a major mechanism in creating the efficient
securities markets we assumed we had (and which to any observer, at least
outside of Hyde Park, appear now to be far less efficient than on might
have thought), permitting investors to rely upon the integrity of stock
prices in general and rationally diversify their portfolios without a great
deal of need to perform such research functions themselves. Clearly we
were wrong, as recent studies as to analysts' behavior make clear that the
"sell" recommendation was, until recently, a thing of the past, and that
even the "hold" recommendation was vanishingly scarce. Research, influenced by perverse incentives created by the combination in single firms of
the brokerage function and the investment banking function, has instead
failed in that purpose and created a market in which information is far less
reliable than might have previously been thought and, therefore, by defi92
nition less efficient.
The Act works to correct this in two ways. Outside of the parameters
of traditional corporate governance, it requires the Commission to adopt
89. See id.
90. See id.

91. While not an expert in legal ethics, I do think that Congress reached too
far, and the Commission is trying to avoid destroying the very significant differences in professional obligations between public auditors and lawyers. Because the
provision was rather ill-advised, the Commission's attempted retreat, through interpretation provided in the release, is entirely understandable.
92. There is a reason why SanfordJ. Bernstein and Charles Schwab have been
among the most respected research departments in the industry.
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rules protecting analysts from any sort of penalty or retaliation from their
employers because of their recommendations and requires, as a legal matter, separation of investment banking functions from brokerage and analyst functions. -3 It also requires analysts to publicly disclose conflicts of
interest. 9 4 These protections and rules are clearly designed to increase
the objectivity of analysts' reports and, therefore, the efficiency of the
market.
At the same time, however, albeit less directly than in the case of auditors and lawyers, the effect of the Act is to improve the quality of monitoring by creating legal incentives and penalties encouraging analysts to more
thoroughly and carefully examine the corporations they follow, thus providing an important adjunct to boards, auditors and lawyers in corporate
monitoring. While less direct and more modest in scope than the ways in
which the Act interjects auditors and lawyers into the corporate governance structure, and while not providing substantive standards of reporting
or performance as it does in the case of auditors, CEOs, CFOs and audit
committees, the Act nonetheless imports another measure of federal law
into the corporate governance structure.
What should be clear from the preceding discussion is the extent to
which the Act expands, or potentially expands, the scope of corporate governance rather dramatically by directly assigning governance responsibilities to actors who previously had stood aloof from matters of governance
(although their actions clearly played a role in corporate governance). At
least as important, these roles are part of a new federal scheme, largely
detailed and enforced by the Commission, which significantly intrudes
upon, if it does not necessarily supplant (or at least not supplant completely) the role of state corporate governance law.
Thus, the Act potentially serves as a declaration that our monitoring
model of corporate governance, in which we principally relied upon a
weak system of monitoring by the board (governed by laws that allowed it
to abrogate much of its responsibility) and the market is a failure, as
demonstrated by the events of 2002. It serves, to some extent, as an assertion that the corrective lies in the federal takeover of substantive aspects of
state corporate law, as well as the mandated inclusion within the governance machinery, the responsibilities of which are directed toward ensuring
the integrity of the monitoring and disclosure necessary to ensure that our
corporate system works effectively. While not quite the federal corporate
law envisioned by Bill Cary, it has the potential to rock the preeminence of
Delaware as the font of all things corporate and ensure some degree of
uniformity in standards of care and loyalty in public corporations.

93. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501 (a)(1), (3).
94. See id. § 501(b).
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If all the Act had the potential to accomplish was that which I have
thus far described, it would be technically interesting, principally to lawyers, and disturbing to those who idealize or at least prefer the current
balkanized state of our corporate law. It might improve the integrity of
the system, but it is not at all clear to me that the same result could not
have been accomplished by appropriately funding the Commission and
the vigorous enforcement of our existing securities laws. After all, much
of the really bad conduct that led to the crisis violated already existing
laws, and the Act doesn't do much to address some of the conduct that was
legal. Perhaps part of the problem was the environment in which those
laws existed. For in a funny way, one of the things that made the Act an
important tool in stemming the market's freefall in the summer of 2002 is
the thirty-year deregulation of our securities markets, starting with the
1975 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 5 and, most dramatically if not

most recently, capped-off with the so-called Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.96
But environment is important in another way too, and it is in this
respect that the Act has the potential to accomplish its greatest good, albeit a good at which it does not appear directly to aim. The purpose of
the Act, as articulated, is to restore investor confidence by shoring up the
integrity of corporate governance, financial reporting and market mechanisms-an add-on, if you will, to existing securities laws. But, taken as a
whole, the Act has the potential to redress, at least to some important
extent, the real cause of the corporate collapse of 2002.
Short-termism in individual investing may or may not be a good thing.
After all, specialists, market makers and day traders make significant profits by short-term trading, and in so doing they may help to move market
prices in the "right" direction. But much-if not all-of the information
these traders rely on is information about stock price movements, not information about the assets, liabilities, profits and cash flows of the corporations in whose stock they trade. The right direction for these short-term
traders is determined by the simple laws of supply and demand (and
therefore market psychology) rather than by corporate fundamentals. It
may be that these traders move the market in the right direction, but so
much depends upon how you define right direction. In any event, and
regardless of how one feels about the subject, specialists and market makers at least stabilize the market by matching supply and demand. The
question of value, and how it affects corporate management, is not importantly on the table.
Short-termism in individual investing may or may not be a good thing.
Short-termism as the driving force of investing is, however, highly destruc95. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
96. See MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 135-46; see also Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
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tive. 7 Short-term investing breeds excessive volatility and damages investor confidence in the markets. Short-term investing pressures managers to
engage in short-term management, damaging the future prospects of the
corporation with promiscuous layoffs, inadequate funding for research
and development, environmental pollution and substandard production
quality. Short-term investing drives managers to manage earnings, not
business. Only by managing earnings can most corporations consistently
satisfy a short-term market's demand for constantly increasing stock prices.
Also, managing earnings instead of businesses in response to the shortterm pressures of the market (as well as other factors like the dominance
of executive stock options as a major form of compensation-sufficiently
so that it now comprises approximately 15 percent of market capitalization) leads managers to mislead investors, sometimes, as we have recently
seen, crossing over the line into gross illegality. 98
The Act does not address this problem, or at least not directly. But in
certain provisions of the Act, and even more apparently in the regulations,
one can see the tools necessary-if not sufficient-to reverse the shortterm managerial ethic.99 For in the statute and rules are the seeds of the
destruction of the utility of managing earnings. If managing earnings can
no longer serve the purpose of misleading investors, then the incentive to
manage earnings will disappear. As a result, we could well see managers
return to the economically and socially important task of managing businesses rather than stock prices.
There are a number of places where these tools are introduced.
These include the Commission's rules requiring the clear explanation of
non-GAAP financial information (which means pro forma financial statements which means earnings projections),11°1 rules governing the clear explanation, disclosure, tabular presentation and discussion in the issuer's
MD&A of off-balance sheet financing,"" CEO and CFO certification of
financial statements, with the Commission's added emphasis on cash flows
as well as their additional requirement that these officers certify as to the
general fairness of the corporation's financial presentation, and not simply the GAAP presentation. 102 Taken together, these provisions and regu97. See MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 4-11 (developing this argument in detail);
see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1263, 1283-1301 (1992) (beginning exploration of these ideas).
98. See MITCHELL, supra note 7, at 45-48, 52 (addressing some causes of development of short-term investing ethic).
99. See id. (describing my own solutions).
100. See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act
Release No. 33,8176, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,816, at 86,846 (Jan. 22, 2003).
101. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8182, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,821, at 86,980 (Jan. 28, 2003). I am tempted to refer to
this as the "Enron" release since it addresses issues raised almost exclusively among
the corporate scandals in the Enron case.
102. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
86,720, at 86,128 (Aug. 28, 2002).
L. Rep. (CCH)
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lations effectively demand that any attempt to manage earnings be clearly
disclosed and that the absence of an attempt to do so be certified by the
CEO and CFO. The incentive to manage earnings is destroyed-it cannot
be hidden any longer. Any attempt to circumvent this incentive change
exposes the corporation's CEO and CFO to liability. Without the opportunity to manage earnings, increases in stock prices can only come from real
earnings, real cash. The Act and its regulations have the potential to return managers to managing businesses, rather than managing financial
statements.
A.

Pro Formas

Earnings statements and other extra-filing communications are dealt
with by Section 401 of the Act and Regulation G. 103 Typically reported
using "pro forma" financial information, the Commission requires instead
the term "non-GAAP financial measures" to describe these reports in order to avoid confusion with the use of the term "pro forma" in Regulation
S-X. 10 4 "Non-GAAP financial measure" is defined to mean a "numerical

measure of a registrant's historical or future financial performance, financial position or cash flows" that either includes or excludes amounts that
10 5
would be included or excluded in financials complying with GAAP.
The rule is intended to be broad enough so that compliance is required
whether or not the non-GAAP financial presentation would be subject to
the antifraud laws. The Regulation requires issuers using non-GAAP financial measures not only to disclose at the same time the most "comparable [financial] measure calculated and presented in accordance with
GAAP," but also to present a reconciliation that is clearly understandable
to investors of the differences between the GAAP measures and the non10 6
GAAP measures.
The Commission is quite clear that it is aiming directly at the practice
of excluding non-recurring expenses or revenues as well as presentation of
earnings in the form of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization ("EBITDA"), which are two of the most common techniques
of presenting earnings information in a way that makes earnings look better than they would be if presented in accordance with GAAP. 117 In other
words, they are two of the most common ways of managing earnings. In
announcing this requirement, the Commission is clearly focused on cash
flows as well as earnings, an important observation because cash flows are
far more difficult to obscure or misstate. 1 0 8 They are also the essence of
103. See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act
Release No. 33,8176, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,816, at 86,831-32 (Jan. 22, 2003).
104. See id. 86,816, at 86,833-34.
105. See id. 86,816, at 86,833.
106. Id.
107. See id. 86,816, at 86,834.
108. See id. 86,816, at 86,835.
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the value of a share of stock, that value being the cash an investor anticipates receiving from the investment.
The Commission also requires these presentations to be included in
filings with the Commission, and requires the presentation, with "greater
or equal" prominence, of the most comparable GAAP measure as well as
statements explaining management's purpose in using non-GAAP financial statements and noting why management believes them to be useful. 1 9
In this respect, the regulations effectively require management to admit
that it is managing earnings if that indeed is what it is trying to do.
While the rules also include changes in Form 8K and other interesting details, for purposes of this discussion the foregoing should make it
clear that the Act has the potential to destroy the practice (or at least the
utility of the practice) of managing earnings.
B.

Off-Balance Sheet Financing; The Enron Rule

As is certainly well-known by now, one of the principal ways in which
Enron, Act 1 of the corporate follies of 2002, was able to deceive investors
as to its fundamental value was by engaging in extensive off-balance sheet
financing transactions which had the effect of both understating liabilities
and overstating earnings."1 0 Section 401 of the Act requires issuers to disclose off-balance sheet financing transactions as well as other arrangements, obligations and contingent obligations "that may have a material
current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of revenues or expenses."] 1
One
would have thought the accounting rules already required such disclosure
(indeed, the MD&A rules already require such disclosure), but Enron's
financial statements were, if nothing else, the perfection of (perhaps)
technical but hardly substantive compliance with these rules.
The Commission, in passing regulations to deal with this problem,
goes beyond financial statement disclosure and directs issuers to discuss
such financing techniques in detail in the MD&A section of their Commission filings."1 2 The rules define off-balance sheet financing (arguably a bit
more narrowly than does the Act) and determine that disclosure is necessary only when the issuer is subject to a binding agreement. 113 In another
respect, the rules track regulations in terms of materiality. The rules require MD&A discussion as long as the possibility of loss is "reasonably
109. See id. 86,816, at 86,837.
110. Of course the fact that Enron failed properly to disclose these transactions was critical to its ability to maintain the house of cards.
111. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 406(a)(j), 116 Stat.
745, 789-90 (2002).
112. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8182, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,821, at 86,983 (Jan. 28, 2003).
113. Id. 1 86,821, at 86,979.
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likely", the same standard as is currently required in the MD&A. 1 14 In this
respect, the Commission backed off a more aggressive interpretation of
the Act than it took in the proposed rule which would have required disclosure if the possibility of loss was "not remote".
Most important is the substance of disclosure itself. The issuer is required to discuss "the nature and business purpose of the off-balance
sheet arrangements," as well as their significant terms and conditions, as
long as the issuer has a direct or contingent obligation even though it may
not be a party to the agreement.' 1 5 The issuer has to disclose not only the
overall magnitude of the issuer's off-balance sheet arrangements, but also
specifically has to disclose revenues, expenses, cash flows, retained interests, issued securities, indebtedness and the nature and amount of any
6
other contingent or non-contingent obligations or liabilities."1 Here, the
Commission is again expressly concerned with adequate disclosure of effects of the arrangements on a corporation's liquidity and cash flows and
demands that management present a big-picture analysis of such arrangements and their effects as well as the details to the point where tabular
disclosure might be required and the entire discussion is placed in a separate section of the MD&A. One could again get lost in the details of the
regulations, but the details discussed so far make it perfectly clear that to
the extent such rules are seriously enforced (rather than allowing the development of meaningless boilerplate as to, for example, management's
reasons for using such arrangements), the utility of off-balance sheets and
other similar arrangements for misleading investors as to the corporation's actual financial position (again, importantly including its cash flows)
is dramatically diminished if not destroyed.
C.

Cash, Cash, Cash

As a final example of the ways in which the Act and regulations potentially destroy the ability of managers to mislead investors as to a corporation's fundamental values is the final rules governing CEO and CFO
certification of the financial statements discussed above 11 7 and the accompanying disclosures required in Commission filings." 18 Two things about
this certification and disclosure are particularly notable-both added by
the Commission in its belief that doing so best furthers the purposes of the
Act. The first is an emphasis on cash flows. This is particularly important
because, as I noted earlier, cash is the only reliable measure of a corporation's worth. The 1990's bubble market should have taught all but the
most evangelistic market-efficiency gurus not to rely upon market prices as
114. Id.
115. See id. 86,821, at 86,980.
116. See id.
117. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
86,720, at 86,130 (Aug. 28, 2002).
L. Rep. (CCH)
118. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8177, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,818, at 86,885-86 Uan. 23, 2003).
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a correct measure of value (while it remains true that at any particular
moment that price is what you will get for your stock if you then sell it or
what you must pay if you then buy it.) Moreover, earnings and other accounting measures are subject to accounting conventions and manipulation, although if the rules I have previously discussed are enforced, and
with the (hopefully) looming presence of the new Public Oversight Board,
accounting measures will become more reliable. But it is as true now as it
was in 1938, when John Burr Williams penned a bit of doggerel (as well as
a serious book), that the real value of stock is the cash you expect to receive from investing in it. 119
The second is the fact that the rules require that the CEO and CFO
certify that the corporation's financial statements "fairly present" its finan1 20
cial condition, not only in GAAP terms but in terms of common sense.
This latter requirement is striking, for it precludes these officers from hiding behind the financial statements, no matter how GAAP-compliant they
are, and forces them to assert that the financials are meaningful (that is, in
terms of the kinds of things one cares about in assessing returns to investors, like cash flows, results of operations, and the like). In effect, this
certification has the effect of calling on the CEO and CFO to publicly
proclaim their own belief in the "hard numbers," as it were. Again this
creates a strong disincentive to manage earnings, hide liabilities, emphasize non-GAAP financial measures and generally engage in the kind of
financial trickery that characterized the crises of the past year. At the
same time, while their certification is conditioned by their "knowledge,"
there is a presumed level of due diligence expected from these officers,
not only in the Commission's rules, but also in the additional fact that they
are to be responsible for and must certify not only internal controls, but
also disclosure controls and procedures-all of which presuppose the
need to make the disclosures I have already discussed in subsections A and
B above. Incentives for meaningful-not technical-integrity are thus
created.
D.

A New World of Investors

The Commission and the Act have created an environment in which
there will be little profit in managing earnings and other sorts of financial
chicanery that might help to bloat stock prices in the short-term but leave
the corporation wanting in the long-term. To the extent this becomes the
case, we will ideally see management turn again to the management of
their businesses rather than their finances. MBA students might again major in marketing, management, human resources and the like, instead of
flocking to finance, and a talent pool of good old-fashioned business man119. See generally JOHN BURR WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE
(1938).
120. See Securities Act Release No. 33,8124, [2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)
86,720, at 86,144 (Aug. 28, 2002).
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agers might grow. From the investor's standpoint, there will no longer be
any excuse to say that the investor was deceived by a corporation's numbers, and, more to the point and socially beneficial, there will be relatively
little profit in promiscuous short-term trading. For the way to make
money from a corporation that is managed for its business rather than its
finance is "the old fashioned way"-to earn it. One could dare hope for
the eventual development of a new investment culture in which stockholders buy and hold for the long-term, investigating their companies and
reading financial information and other disclosures prior to investing.
One can hope. Whether the regulations are vigorously enforced, or
whether the SEC is lax, whether institutional investors continue to exert
recent
short-term pressure on management, and whether the market's
21
need for instant gratification continues, remain to be seen.'
121. For the effect of this pressure on short-termism, see

MITCHELL,

supra

note 7, at 170-74.
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